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This paper estimates the economic returns to education in China from 1989 
to 2009, using the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) dataset. We 
find that education returns for one additional year generally increase from 
2.6% in 1989 to 7.9% in 2009. Education returns, however, may reflect 
signals of innate ability, or the accumulation of human capital. Moreover, 
traditional Ordinary Least Square estimates may be biased by selection 
problems and mix-ups of age group heterogeneity. Hence, we estimate the 
marginal effects of schooling with the increasing labour markets experience, 
using the Heckman Selection Model. We find that the education returns for 
one additional year decline with labour markets experience, which support 
human capital hypothesis for all age groups except the group educated 
during the “Cultural Revolution”. Different dynamics of education returns in 
the four age groups are identified with large influence of institutional 
reforms in the labour markets, supporting the transition explanation of the 
evolution of education returns in China.  
JEL classification: J24, J31, P23, C52 
Keywords: Education returns, China, Selection 
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Introduction 
There is a well-established literature on the economic returns to education, since Schultz 
(1961) and Mincer (1974). According to human capital theory, following Becker (1962), 
education is an investment that produces knowledge acquisition and increases 
productivity, which in turn leads to higher income. Human capital theory bears a strong 
resemblance to vintage capital theory. The individual’s capital stock (his or her level of 
education) can be treated as a factor of production in its own right and may gradually 
depreciate with time (Byron and Manaloto 1990). Thus, the distribution of labour 
incomes can be regarded as a function of education and experience, as in the benchmark 
Mincerian model which involves regression of the natural logarithm of earnings against 
educational attainment and working experience.  
A large amount of empirical research, based on the Mincerian model, has been 
carried out for many countries and time periods and confirms that better-educated 
individuals earn higher wages, experience less unemployment, and work in more 
prestigious occupations than their less-educated counterparts (Card 1999, O'Mahony 
and Stevens 2009). Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) finds that the education returns 
for one additional year are 9.7% for world average, 9.9% for Asian average as well as 
the 10.7-10.9% range for low and middle incomes. However, literature on economic 
returns to education in China is still sparse and shows much lower rates of returns 
compared with those from other countries, especially developing ones. An early study 
on this topic for China was made by Byron and Manaloto (1990). Using a sample of 
eight hundred adult workers from the city of Nanjing in 1986, they estimate a low rate 
of returns between 1.2% and 3.7% for one additional year of schooling. Meng and Kidd 
(1997) also find a low rate of returns to education of 2.7% in 1987. Liu (1998) uses the 
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China Household Income Project (CHIP) 1988 data and finds a slightly larger but still 
low rate of returns to education of 3.6% . Therefore, Fleisher et al. (2005) conclude that 
China is an outlier, in that its rapid economic growth is associated with returns to 
education remaining below the world average for comparable countries.  
Low returns to education do not necessarily imply that education has no value in 
China. It may be because the value of education has not been properly reflected as 
private economic returns in labour markets. Fleisher and Wang (2004) find that the 
wages of educated workers are well below their marginal product in China, and the 
social returns to education will exceed the estimated private returns. Hence, the most 
widely accepted explanation of lower Chinese education returns may be the explanation 
of labour markets transition. Before 1978, wages of all workers were determined and 
controlled through a rigid system in China, designed to reduce labour costs during the 
rapid industrialization. Low wages were made possible by state-subsidized food prices 
and state provision of non-wage benefits to workers and their families. Throughout the 
economic reforms in China into the early 1990s, the wage differentials by levels of skill 
and schooling still remained narrow. After the “socialist market economy” was 
authorized in the early 1990s, the rigid wage system was gradually replaced by the 
flexible wage system. 
1
 Thus, the wage reform in China freed up the compressed wage 
differentials and thereafter had similar implications for the economic returns to 
education. 
The explanation of labour markets transition is supported by the literature dealing 
with evidence of increasing returns to education over time, following the progress of 
economic reforms. Recent research suggests that reform and marketization are finally 
contributing to an increase in the relative wages of educated workers (Fleisher and 
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Wang 2005). Zhang et al. (2005) find a dramatic increase in education returns, from 
only 4.0%  in 1988 to 10.2% in 2001 for one additional year of schooling. Most of the 
rise occurs after 1992 and supports the explanation of labour markets transition. 
This paper provides alternative points of view on returns to education in China, 
using recent available China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) datasets from 1989 
to 2009. We have three objectives. First, education has an important effect on wages but 
it is not clear whether this is because education raises productivity or because education 
is simply a signal of innate ability (Chevalier et al. 2004). We need to test whether the 
returns to education in China reflect accumulation of human capital or are just signals of 
innate ability. Following Qiu and Hudson (2010), we put the interaction of education 
and experience into regressions for all employees and for four age groups. We calculate 
the marginal effects of schooling at different percentiles of experience (Friedrich 1982, 
Dreher and Gassebner 2007, Potrafke 2009) and then graph their trends with ranges of 
standard errors. We find that Chinese data appear to strongly support the human capital 
explanation. 
Second, most studies on education returns in China only apply the traditional OLS 
Mincerian model, which ignores the probable selection biases of employment. If the job 
assignments in the labour markets are not random, OLS estimation of education returns 
might be biased. The direction of biases is dependent on how jobs are assigned and how 
people make self-selections in the labour markets (Roy 1951, Heckman 1974, Heckman 
and Honoré 1990). Appleton et al. (2005) observe a continued influence of political 
forces of loyalty, power, and patronage on the rewards for labour in the Chinese labour 
markets. Considering the selection bias of employment, we compare the estimates of 
education returns in a Heckman selection model with results from traditional OLS.  
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Last, but not least, the aggregated estimates of repeated cross-section regressions 
may be mix-ups of many heterogeneous cohorts and hence may suffer serious 
composition biases (Solon et al. 1994). Li (2003) uses the 1988 CHIP data to classify 
workers into three cohorts depending on when they started working: prior to economic 
reform, up to 1979; in the early stage of urban reforms (1980 to 1987); or during the 
advanced stage of urban reform (1988 to 1995). The average annual rates of returns to 
college education were 7.7% for the pre-1979 cohort, 14.1% for the 1980–1987 cohort, 
and 14.8% for the 1988–1995 cohort. Maurer-Fazio (1999) finds higher annual rates of 
education returns for the young (under age 30, 6.6%) than for their elders (above age 50, 
3.4%) in 1989. Fleisher and Wang (2005) estimate education returns in the first and 
subsequent jobs, with workers grouped by the year of the first job, in order to observe 
the impact of the “Cultural Revolution”. Their OLS estimators find that annual rates of 
education returns to the younger cohorts (whose first jobs were in 1984, 1987 and 1990) 
have received smaller returns to education than did the older cohorts (whose first jobs 
occurred prior to 1970 and 1975, and were affected by the Cultural Revolution). These 
cohort analyses reveal different views of education returns, compared to traditional 
aggregated analysis. Hence, we estimate wage equations for four age groups which can 
provide insights into the nature of labour markets changes and the fluctuations in returns 
to schooling over time.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we outline the 
empirical specifications for our three objectives. In section 3 we describe our data and 
present descriptive statistics. Estimates of the returns to schooling are presented in 
section 4. Section 5 forms our conclusions. 
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Empirical specifications 
Most previous literature relies on the theoretical foundations for returns to education, 
laid down by Schultz (1961), Becker (1962) and Mincer (1974). We also estimate a 
semi-logarithmic specification for the wages based on the Mincerian equation, given as: 
 
)1(Prln 1654
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where the dependent variable iwln is the log form of real hourly wage rate of employee 
i. Wages consist of basic wages, subsidies and bonuses. We use the urban/rural 
consumer price indices, classified by year and province from the China Statistics 
Yearbooks, to deflate employees’ labour incomes. In the independent variables Si is 
years of schooling; Expi is an employee’s potential labour markets experience, 
measured as age minus years of schooling minus six (Katz and Murph 1992); Urbani is 
a dummy variable for the urban areas; Genderi is a dummy variable capturing the wage 
differential between men and women; and Pri is a set of province dummy variables. 
 
Signal and human capital effects  
There is debate whether the impact of education on earnings isolates the effects that are 
caused by education from the consequences of innate ability. Economists have relied on 
natural experiments, twins data, regression discontinuity, and field experiments to 
control for innate ability and estimate the causal impact of education (human capital) on 
earnings (see a review in Card (1999)). The CHNS cannot provide data for a direct 
control on innate ability as do these classic models. However, we can develop Qiu and 
Hudson’s (2010) model to test whether education is the signal of innate ability, or the 
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accumulation of human capital. It is assumed that schooling ( iS ) that an individual 
acquires is a function of innate ability (
iA ):  
 
)2()( ii AmS   
 
Hence, more able individuals can grasp knowledge more rapidly and transform 
schooling into human capital more efficiently, that is, 0/  ii AS . We can argue that 
the basic theory underlying the earnings’ equation is that wages ( iw ) are a function of 
human capital ( iH ):   
 
)3()( ii Hfw   
 
In efficient labour markets, jobs with higher wages will be assigned to individuals 
with higher productivity. Hence, individuals with higher human capital would have 
higher wages, that is, 0/  iHf . Human capital of an individual itself is a function of 
innate ability (
iA ), education-augmented human capital ( iS ) and experience-augmented 
human capital (from on-the-job training or “learning by doing” processes, iExp ) as 
follows: 
 
)4()()( iiii ExpgShAH   
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Human capital augmented by experience is also possibly influenced by innate 
ability. More able individuals can grasp knowledge from on-the-job training or 
“learning by doing” processes more rapidly and transform it into human capital more 
efficiently, that is 0
),(



i
ii
A
AExpg
. However, an inverted U curve of experience in 
earnings equations with quadratic experience is widely observed in the literature (for 
China, see Appleton et al. (2005) and Qiu and Hudson (2010)). The individual’s capital 
stock from experience can be treated as a factor of production in its own right and 
gradually depreciates with time. Hence, we can firstly assume (for simplicity) that the 
experience-augmented human capital is derived only from experience, and we also 
assume linearity and that it is possible to separate the three types of human capital, in 
equation (4). We cannot observe innate ability directly, hence we estimate wages as a 
function of education and experience as: 
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The total derivative of the wage function with respect to experience is as follows: 
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We calculate the partial derivative of wage function with respect to schooling, and 
allow the correlation between schooling and experience-augmented human capital. The 
equation (6) has the form:  
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For simplicity, we drop the individual subscript i. The first item is the quadratic 
experience items in equation (1) to proxy the isolated experience effect on the wage. 
The second item is the combination of signal and human capital effects of schooling on 
the wage. The final item is the interaction of schooling and experience. If the only 
impact of schooling is to proxy innate ability, schooling cannot enhance human capital, 
that is, 0
)(



S
Sh
. Then, the above equation becomes: 
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The coefficients of schooling are only capturing the effects of variations of innate 
ability among individuals on wages. The impact of education on wages should be 
constant over time, as the coefficients of experience and education interaction are zero. 
Riley (1979) and Farber and Gibbons (1996) also argue that a basic condition for a 
signalling equilibrium is that employers’ predictions based on education signals are 
correct on average. If not, then education and experience could enhance productivity, 
supporting the human capital theory.  
Do the returns to schooling decline with rising experience since the individual left 
formal education? Normally, with rising experience, education will depreciate. Hence, 
the interaction between schooling and experience-augmented human capital should 
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show a negative correlation (substitution relationship)
 
0
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 and make the 
coefficients of interaction items also negative because 0


H
f
 and 0
)(

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S
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. But, in a 
reforming society such as China, education chances may be very selective for innate 
ability (for example, very strict college entrance examinations) or political virtue 
(Broaded 1990). Individual human capital, enhanced by education and experience, 
could be complementary if we consider the possibility that the innate ability or political 
virtue also enhances human capital from experience. Education-augmented human 
capital could be positively correlated with experience-augmented human capital. The 
marginal effects of schooling may increase with experience in this simultaneous system. 
We use pooled data to test the trend of education returns with rising experience over 
time. Therefore, an interaction item is very important in our wage equation. After we 
add the interaction variable of schooling and experience, and allow year dummies Y for 
macro time dynamics, the empirical specification for our pooled data is as follows: 
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Heckman selection bias 
One important issue to consider is the fact that wages are only observed for individuals 
actually working. Some individuals become inactive because they do not find a job, or 
their reservation wages are higher than offer wages. There would be a potential 
selection bias when estimating earnings equations. The Heckman selection model 
provides a solution through an additional selection equation (Heckman 1976). People 
with more education might have higher participation rates, because they are more 
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attractive to employers and their opportunity cost of unemployment are higher. 
Education increases expected wages over time, through higher wages when working 
(the effect captured through the Mincerian equation above) and through a higher 
probability of being employed (this effect will be captured through the Heckman 
selection model below).  
As derived from equation (9), the hourly wage rate is a function of schooling, 
experience, urban, gender, province and year dummies, whereas the likelihood of 
employment is a function of marital status and (implicitly) the wage (via the inclusion 
of all above variables which determine the wage). The identifying variable for 
employment selection is the marital status of a respondent, that is, a dummy variable 
(0= single; 1=once married) which is widely used in literature (see an example for Italy, 
in Brown and Sessions (1999)). Therefore, we assume that wage is observed if  
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The inverse Mills ratio (lambda) defined as in (Heckman 1979) is designed to correct 
for selectivity bias in the samples. A significant coefficient on the lambda term indicates 
non-random selection into employment in the relevant sample.  
 
Age groups 
To gain more understanding of patterns of returns to schooling in China, we estimate 
the regressions with separated age group samples. The four age groups are people born 
before 1950, during 1950-1961, during 1962-1980 and in 1981 or after. The cut-off time 
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choice of groups is based on the widely accepted structural break points in Chinese 
modern history to allow heterogeneity of groups in our study. The first structural break 
point is the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 and then two 
structural break points based on the two baby boom periods (1950-1961 and 1962-1980). 
Finally, the full enforcement of the “One Child Policy” in 1981 defines the last group.  
These structural break points can be clearly observed in a birth rate graph over the 
period of 1949-2009 (see Figure 1). The birth rate was above 30 per thousand in the 
1950s. The economic crisis from the “Great Leap Forward” and famine during the 
period 1958-1961 resulted in 30 million extra deaths (Lin 1990), and the lowest birth 
rate at 18.02 per thousand in 1961. Afterwards, with the economic recovery, China 
experienced the largest baby boom, with the birth rate peaking at 43.37 per thousand in 
1963. From 1961 to 1980, the newborns were about 310 million and comprised 23.5% 
of the total population in 2009. 
2
 The large number of children born caused China’s 
leaders to be very concerned about the growth potential of this extraordinarily large age 
group. The “One Child Campaign” was launched in December 1979. In Feb 1980, 
Guangdong province was the first province to make regulations for implementation, 
followed by other provinces. The full enforcement of “One-Child policy” across country 
started from 1981. There were two small peaks of the birth rate; between 1980 and 1982, 
due to the implementation of China’s new Marriage Law in 1981; and the consequent 
baby boom during 1984 and 1987. After that, the birth rate continued to decline to be as 
low as 12.13 per thousand in 2009.  
The special age group born 1950-1961 mainly received their education during the 
“Cultural Revolution” period (1966-1976), when the leftist ideological goals of an 
egalitarian educational agenda reached a peak and the normal education process was 
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interrupted and replaced by continuous political movements (Qian and Smyth 2008). 
They find this group has considerably lower returns to education than younger people 
who received standardised education and entered the labour market during the urban 
economic reform era.  
 
(Figure 1 around here) 
 
Data description 
The data used in this paper are eight waves (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006 
and 2009) of the CHNS dataset, which has been collected by the Carolina Population 
Centre and the National Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety. The CHNS data cover 
two decades of Chinese economic reform since 1989, and contain accurate information 
on wages, education, and other demographic information which provides a basis for an 
estimate of the returns to education. Eight provinces are covered by data in the period of 
1989-1997 and nine provinces thereafter. 
3
 We exclude individuals working as farmers, 
fishermen and hunters in the primary sector (mainly agriculture). Employees with a 
salary (wage earners) between 16 and 65 years old are our basic sample. 
4
 The full 
sample composed of employees, unemployed persons and self-employees is also 
analyzed for the Heckman correction. 
Table 1 represents the data description for the employee and full samples. For the 
employee sample, the real hourly wage rate (based on 1995 RMB) is below 2 Yuan and 
grows comparatively slowly before 1993. However, the hourly wage rate dramatically 
doubles in the 4 years from 1993 to 1997, and then doubles again in the 9 years from 
1997 to 2006. In the last 3 years of our sample period, 2006-2009, the hourly wage rate 
14 
 
still grows by about 30%. The rapidly rising wage rate, especially after 1993, is also 
observed by other authors, such as Yang et al. (2010). 
The average schooling increases with rising wages by about 40% over the last two 
decades (from 7.49 years in 1989 to 10.54 years in 2009). The working experience 
decreases in the 1990s and increases in the 2000s, but still seems quite stable, ranging 
between 20.15 years in 2000 to 24.33 years in 2009. About 60% of employees are males 
and less than half the employees are in an urban area. About 80% of the employees are 
married once, in our employee sample. The largest baby boom group, born in 1962-
1980, occupies 37% of total employment in 1989, increasing to around 55% after 1993. 
Hence, this group can benefit much more than others from the dramatic rising wages 
after 1993. Actually, we find the special wage premium (or “rent”) in returns to 
schooling of this group in the later analysis. The oldest group (born before 1950) keeps 
on decreasing due to retirement. The youngest group (born in 1981 or after) has no 
observation before 1997, and is still small in 1997, so we involve this group only after 
1997. The share of the group born just after the foundation of China is stable at around 
30% in the past two decades. Compared with the employee sample, the main difference 
in the full sample is that the average years of schooling is lower (8.48 years in 1989 to 
9.06 years in 2009). That is consistent with the findings  that higher educated 
individuals have higher probability to be employed (O'Mahony and Stevens 2009).  
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the four groups in the pooled dataset of all 
eight waves. For employees, the younger groups have higher real hourly wage rates and 
years of schooling, but shorter potential labour markets experience. For example, the 
youngest group (born in 1981 or after) has the highest hourly wage rate at 6.35 Yuan 
(double the oldest), and years of schooling (at 10.89 years, this is 4.35 years longer than 
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the oldest), and lowest experience at 5.11 years (35.6 years less than the oldest). In 
addition, the younger group has a higher female participation rate, higher participation 
rates in rural regions and lower marriage rates. 
Compared with employees, the full sample in the bottom panel has fewer years of 
schooling than employees for all four groups, as we find in Table 1. Each group still has 
distinguishable features as employees. These distinctive characteristics among groups 
reflect volatile changes of Chinese society in recent decades, which imply 
heterogeneous human capital accumulation of different groups from their education and 
experience. If we only consider aggregated results, our estimate may be biased by the 
composition shifts of groups. 
 
(Table 1 around here) 
(Table 2 around here) 
 
Empirical results 
Table 3 presents results of repeated cross-section OLS, as in equation (1). We find, in 
common with others that education returns for one additional year generally increase 
from 2.6% in 1989 to 7.9% in 2009. Results by groups are very similar to the 
aggregated results in 1989, and this is consistent with the highly regulated wage setting 
in the 1980s. With the ownership reform in the 1980s, the role of state-owned 
enterprises has been weakened in the Chinese economy and has triggered the 
transformation from a planned labour allocation system into a well-functioning labour 
markets (Appleton et al. 2005). China authorized the “socialist market economy” to 
accelerate reforms, including to the labour markets, the effect of which led to a major 
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reduction in rates of returns for the aggregated sample or groups in the early 1990s. 
Camposa and Jolliffe’s (2003) study of Hungary, as well as that of Flabbi et al. (2008) 
in examining eight transition economies (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, 
Poland, Russia, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) argue that the skills acquired cannot be 
easily transferred to a changed economic situation. Thus one would expect to see a 
temporary decline to returns during any period of transition.  
Between the trough of 1.4% in 1993 and peak of 9.4% in 2004, there is a 
continuous rising trend of education returns for one additional year, which is also noted 
in the most recent literature (for example, Liu et al. (2010)). After 1997, the four groups 
experience different, but still increasing paths of education returns.  Groups born before 
1950 (8% for one additional year) and 1962-1980 (10% for one additional year) have a 
peak in 2004 as for the employee sample, while the other two groups experience peaks 
in 2006 (both around 10% for one additional year). The decline of education returns 
after 2004 is caused mainly by the structural break of education returns of the group 
born before 1950. Their dramatic fall of education returns (from the peak value to 
insignificance) may reflect the human capital loss of compulsory retirement (especially 
for women), and the rapidly depreciated human capital from education by the new skill-
biased technology (Liu et al. 2010). This loss can only be partly offset by the rising 
employment proportions of the younger groups with still significant and high education 
returns. 
Table 4 shows the estimates from OLS regressions using the pooled dataset for all 
eight waves. In order to test whether schooling only reflects the signal effects of innate 
ability the interaction of schooling and experience has been regarded as an explanatory 
variable, as in equation (9). For all employees, the coefficient of schooling is 6% for 
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one additional year. The highest coefficients are for groups born before 1950 and in 
1981 or after (around 10%), but they are below 5%  for the other two middle-aged 
groups, suggesting lower rates of returns to schooling acquired during the Mao era. The 
difference between Table 4 and Table 3 is derived from the interaction item of 
schooling and experience. The coefficients of schooling in Table 4 are actually the 
education returns when the labour market experience is equal to zero (Friedrich 1982). 
Thus, the above results only show that the new entrants of the oldest and youngest 
groups have higher education returns than new entrants in the other two groups. We 
need to investigate the interaction item for the marginal effects of schooling with 
experience. 
The interaction variable of schooling and experience (divided by 100) is only 
significantly negative for the full employee sample and the group born before 1950, 
which casts doubt on the human capital explanation of education. In order to show the 
dynamics of changing schooling returns by groups, we follow Dreher and Gassebner 
(2007) and Potrafke (2009) to evaluate the marginal effects of schooling at various 
points of the distribution of experience; namely at the 5
th
, 25
th
, median, 75
th
 and 95
th
 
percentiles of the interacted variable. 
5
 Using this method we can distinguish between 
the impact of schooling on wage rates when the levels of experience are low and high. 
All marginal effects are presented in the bottom panel of Table 4. 
 
(Table 3 around here) 
(Table 4 around here) 
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  At the fifth percentile of potential labour markets experience (3.41 years), the 
groups born before 1950 and in 1981 or after have the marginal effects of about 8.5% , 
higher than the other two middle-aged groups (each around 4.5% ), and similar to the 
coefficients of schooling as experience equals 0. With increase in experience, the groups 
born before 1950 and in 1981 or after have declining marginal effects of schooling. 
However, the group born 1962-1980 has significant and increasing marginal effects, 
which are also significant and stable over experience for the group born 1950-1961.  
Figure 2 illustrates the trends of marginal effects of schooling with increasing 
experience, with the lower and upper limits of one standard deviation for all the 
employees and the four groups. Equation (7) shows that the coefficients of schooling 
only reflect the signal of innate ability, because the coefficients of interaction are 
insignificantly different from zero. Hence, the signal model fits the group born 1950-
1961 in Table 4 and Figure 2 very well. If the interactions have negative coefficients, 
the longer an individual has been out of school, the lower are his/her education returns 
for one additional year of schooling, which fits the groups born before 1950 and in 1981 
or after in Table 4 and Figure 2. Possible explanations for this difference include a 
vintage effect, the rising quality of education, and greater mobility among younger 
workers because they have made fewer employer-specific investments. People with 
longer experience also are likely to be more constrained by wage compression and other 
restrictions of past employment arrangements. Coefficients of schooling in this case 
may include both signal and human capital effects of schooling, which would be a 
traditional endogeneity problem. 
6
 
Moreover, if the innate ability or education enhanced human capital can also 
enhance human capital from on-the-job training and “learning by doing” processes, 
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education enhanced human capital is positively correlated (hence complementary) with 
experience enhanced human capital in equation (7). The longer an individual has been 
out of school, the higher are his/her returns to education. Therefore, the group born 
1962-1980 (if they are employed) can benefit from the “rent” from interaction between 
education and experience. In this case, coefficients of schooling also include both signal 
and human capital effects of schooling and show a rising trend in Figure 2. 
 
(Figure 2 around here) 
 
Next, we will use the Heckman selection model to correct selection biases. We 
apply the Heckman selection model to provide consistent, asymptotically efficient 
estimates for schooling. Table 5 presents the results of the Heckman selection model 
using equation (9) and (10). The selectivity effect (lambda) is significant for the full 
sample and the four groups. LR/Wald tests of independent equations (rho = 0) are easily 
rejected for all ML specifications. These tests clearly justify the Heckman selection 
model with data. By correcting the selection bias, the education returns for the full 
sample decrease from 6% to 5.2% for one addition year, and decrease from 9.1% to 7.4% 
for the group born before 1950.  Returns do not change very much for the group born 
1950-1961, while the two younger groups have higher rates (from 4.1% to 11.8% for 
the group 1962-1980; and from 9.3% to 22.1% for the group born in 1981 or after) than 
in the OLS specification. Although these results are only point estimates, as experience 
is equal to 0, we still find that they are closer to the results in other transition countries 
(Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004, Flabbi et al. 2008). 
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The Heckman correction also has a significant effect on coefficients of interaction 
of schooling and experience. Figure 3 illustrates all negative correlations (substitution 
relationship) between marginal effects of schooling and experience. Compared with the 
OLS estimates, the interactive variable of schooling and experience becomes 
significantly negative for the largest baby-boom group (1962-1980) and the one-child-
policy group (in 1981 or after). Selection biases seem very serious for the group 1962-
1980. The positive coefficients of interaction variable in OLS regressions just fit the 
“rents”, as above-equilibrium wages in this group and could give rise to a “hitting the 
jackpot” effect when a job is won (Peng and Siebert 2008). After we correct the 
selection biases, the significantly positive trend of the group 1962-1980 in Figure 2 is 
replaced by a significantly negative trend in Figure 3. 
The only insignificant coefficient remains that to be found in the group born 
1950-1961, the schooling years of which may only reflect the innate ability as we find 
in the OLS regressions. This is not very surprising, because the group born 1950-1961 
mainly received their education during the “Cultural Revolution” period (1966-1976), 
when education chances were only allocated for selected students based on political 
virtue. Those from families of workers, peasants or soldiers were deemed the most 
“virtuous” and were among the first admitted. This has generated the label of worker-
peasant-soldier student (gong-nong-bing xueyuan) for those students entering college 
during the early 1970s. Identification as a Cultural Revolution-era university student 
continues to carry a negative loading and, in general, depressed opportunities for 
advancement (Broaded 1990, Fleisher and Wang 2005).  
For the only-child-policy group, even though the starting education for one 
additional year are as high as about 20% , the most rapidly depreciation of education 
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offsets the high coefficients of schooling as a new entrant. However, since we have only 
a few hundred observations in the youngest group, any formal interpretation should be 
concerned with caveats and needs further research. Therefore, the human capital 
explanation of education is supported by our study, except for the group educated 
during the “Cultural Revolution”.   
 
(Table 5 around here) 
(Figure 3 around here) 
 
Conclusions 
Schooling itself can be identified as an augmenting factor of human capital, or merely 
as signals reflecting innate ability. Moreover, traditional aggregated Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) estimates are biased by selection problem and mix-ups of group 
heterogeneity. Hence, in this paper, we use the eight waves of the CHNS dataset to 
estimate the rates of private returns to schooling in China over the last two decades. We 
categorize data into four age groups according to the structural breaks of the birth rates 
and estimate the marginal effects of schooling with increasing experience, using OLS 
and the Heckman selection model.  
The OLS estimates of education returns for all employees are 2.6% for one 
addition year in 1989, then declining to around 1.5% in 1991 and 1993, possibly due to 
the political campaigns and delayed reaction for labour market reforms. And then, 
education returns increase to 9.4% for one addition year in 2004 before finally dropping 
to 7.9% for one addition year in 2009 with the dramatic loss of human capital of the 
retired group (born before 1950). Groups have similar education returns in the early 
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years of the 1990s, but they experience heterogeneous dynamics later. This suggests a 
substantial influence of institutional reforms in the labour markets. Our age group 
analyses support the labour market transition explanation of the evolution of returns to 
schooling over time. 
The interactive variable of schooling and experience is used in the Heckman 
model to test whether years of schooling only reflect the signal effects of innate ability. 
We find that the education returns for one additional year decline with labour markets 
experience, which supports the human capital hypothesis for all groups except the group 
born 1950-1961, the schooling years of which may only reflect the innate ability or 
political virtue as we find in the OLS regressions. This conclusion is not very surprising 
because the group born 1950-1961 mainly received their education during the “Cultural 
Revolution” period (1966-1976) when education chances were only allocated for 
selected students based on political virtue. This group also has the lowest education 
returns after we correct selection biases, just as found by Fleisher and Wang (2005). 
Selection biases are very serious for the group born in the period 1962-1980. The 
positive coefficients of interaction variable in OLS regressions just fit the “rents” 
argument in this group with a “hitting the jackpot” effect when a job is won. After we 
correct the selection biases, the significantly positive marginal effects of the group 
1962-1980 in OLS are replaced by significantly negative marginal effects, as expected 
by the human capital hypothesis. For the only-child-policy group, even though the 
starting returns to schooling are as high as about 20%, the most rapid depreciation of 
education offsets the high coefficients of schooling as a new entrant. However, since the 
youngest group has many fewer observations than other groups in our sample, any 
formal interpretation should be concerned with caveats and demands further research.  
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Notes 
1. The flexible wage system allows a variable component in the usual fixed wages. 
The fixed wage includes the basic wages, seniority wage, insurance (medical, 
unemployment and pensions) and a housing fund. The variable wage includes 
bonuses, based on both individual productivity and enterprise profitability. The 
system of allocated housing was largely abolished around 1998 and replaced 
with a housing fund. 
2. Data are from the Chinese Statistics Yearbook 2010. 
3. 8 provinces (Liaoning, Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi and 
Guizhou) for years 1989-1993; 8 provinces in 1997 (replacing Liaoning with 
Heilongjiang); 9 provinces for years 2000-2009 (with both Liaoning and 
Heilongjiang, and other provinces as well). 
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4. The current retirement age in China is usually 60 for men and 50-55 for women. 
But civil servants or professionals can postpone their retirement. Hence, we put 
the upper limit as 65 for our sample. 
5. We use the 5th percentile and 95th percentile to replace the minimum and 
maximum experience years, which are extreme values and hence not 
representative. 
6. We acknowledge the possible endogeneity of schooling in the sense of 
unobserved innate ability in the OLS regressions and the bias it can cause. 
However, we would not correct the endogeneity biases in this paper because we 
have argued that schooling may only reflect the signals of innate ability. 
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Source: National Bureau of Statistics (1999) ; China Statistics Yearbook 2010 
 
Figure 1: Birth rate (per thousand, 1949-2009) 
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Figure 2: Ordinary Least Square Model (OLS) - marginal effects and low/upper limits 
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Figure 3: Heckman Selection Model - marginal effects and low/upper limits 
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Table 1: Data description for cross-sectional data 
Employee sample (Ordinary Least Square model) 
Variable All 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Real hourly wage rate (Yuan) 3.93 1.22 1.46 1.73 3.49 5.13 6.07 6.93 9.05 
Years of schooling (Years) 9.17 7.49 8.29 8.59 9.36 9.85 10.46 10.64 10.54 
Experience (Years) 22.63 23.21 23.40 22.99 20.50 20.15 22.53 23.54 24.33 
Male (%) 0.57 0.52 0.56 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 
Urban (%) 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.48 0.48 0.44 0.50 0.47 0.47 
Married (%) 0.79 0.75 0.80 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.87 0.88 0.88 
Born before 1950 (%) 0.20 0.35 0.34 0.30 0.15 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.03 
Born 1950-1961 (%) 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.25 
Born 1962-1980 (%) 0.47 0.37 0.35 0.41 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.55 0.57 
Born in 1981 or after (%) 0.04 
   
0.00 0.06 0.09 0.10 0.16 
Full sample (Heckman selection model) 
Variable All 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Years of schooling (Years) 8.48 7.16 7.90 8.12 8.37 8.95 8.79 9.04 9.06 
Experience (Years) 24.77 23.45 22.28 22.42 22.36 22.14 26.82 27.87 28.80 
Male (%) 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.48 
Urban (%) 0.43 0.45 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.42 0.42 0.43 
Married (%) 0.78 0.74 0.73 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.88 0.89 0.90 
Born before 1950 (%) 0.23 0.35 0.32 0.29 0.24 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.11 
Born 1950-1961 (%) 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.30 0.31 
Born 1962-1980 (%) 0.43 0.38 0.41 0.45 0.50 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.43 
Born in 1981 or after (%) 0.07 
   
0.03 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.16 
 
Source: CHNS 1989-2009 
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Table 2: Data description for pooled data (four age groups) 
          
Employee sample (Ordinary Least Square model) 
Variable 
Born  Born  Born  Born  
before 1950 1950-1961 1962-1980 in 1981 or after 
Real hourly wage rate (Yuan) 2.99 3.88 4.11 6.35 
Years of schooling (Years) 6.53 9.41 10.06 10.89 
Experience (Years) 40.71 26.31 13.57 5.11 
Male (%) 0.63 0.6 0.53 0.5 
Urban (%) 0.53 0.53 0.44 0.4 
Married (%) 0.99 0.98 0.63 0.23 
Full sample (Heckman selection model) 
Variable 
Born  Born  Born  Born  
before 1950 1950-1961 1962-1980 in 1981 or after 
Years of schooling (Years) 5.88 8.43 9.6 10.36 
Experience (Years) 44.09 30.21 14.39 3.83 
Male (%) 0.5 0.51 0.51 0.52 
Urban (%) 0.48 0.47 0.39 0.39 
Married (%) 0.98 0.98 0.64 0.19 
 
Source: CHNS 1989-2009 
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Table 3: Ordinary Least Square regressions 
Employee sample All years 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Years of schooling 0.043*** 0.026*** 0.015*** 0.014** 0.028*** 0.051*** 0.094*** 0.090*** 0.079*** 
 
0.003 0.004 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.007 
R-squared 0.597 0.138 0.12 0.102 0.1 0.09 0.222 0.238 0.197 
N 17,212 2,712 2,759 2,307 2,080 1,879 1,695 1,787 1,993 
Born before 1950 All years 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Years of schooling 0.026*** 0.028*** 0.009 0.014 0.02 0.070*** 0.080** 0.026 -0.106 
 
0.004 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.019 0.016 0.033 0.043 0.068 
R-squared 0.482 0.211 0.097 0.117 0.055 0.236 0.25 0.441 0.304 
N 2,962 877 736 551 339 210 116 80 53 
Born 1950-1961 All years 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Years of schooling 0.048*** 0.026*** 0.020* 0.017 0.047*** 0.065*** 0.086*** 0.107*** 0.095*** 
 
0.005 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.013 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.018 
R-squared 0.614 0.084 0.087 0.077 0.134 0.101 0.19 0.253 0.192 
N 5,706 978 1,006 849 704 590 531 544 504 
Born 1962-1980 All years 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Years of schooling 0.051*** 0.026*** 0.014 0.014 0.022** 0.034*** 0.100*** 0.093*** 0.087*** 
 
0.004 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.01 0.012 0.01 0.008 
R-squared 0.605 0.063 0.05 0.063 0.09 0.047 0.222 0.209 0.226 
N 7,891 857 1,017 907 1,034 1,000 936 997 1,143 
Born in 1981 or after Years in 2000s 1989 1991 1993 1997 2000 2004 2006 2009 
Years of schooling 0.080*** 
    
0.022 0.025 0.102*** 0.087*** 
 
0.013 
    
0.154 0.038 0.023 0.016 
R-squared 0.306 
    
0.04 0.354 0.243 0.204 
N 650         79 112 166 293 
Note: The standard errors are in italics and adjusted by clusters. *** Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.  Province dummies are included for all 
regressions. Year dummies are included in the ‘all years’ regression. Constants and controlled variables are not reported. 
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Table 4: Ordinary Least Square regressions 
  Employee 
sample 
Born  
before 1950 
Born 
1950-1961 
Born 
1962-1980 
Born  
in 1981 or after 
Years of schooling 0.060*** 0.091*** 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.093*** 
 0.005 0.019 0.013 0.008 0.026 
School*experience/100 -0.067*** -0.178*** 0.004 0.063 -0.265 
 0.015 0.053 0.048 0.043 0.413 
Experience 0.030*** 0.136*** 0.054*** 0.020** 0.032 
 0.003 0.023 0.014 0.008 0.076 
Experience square -0.000*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.001 
 0 0 0 0 0.003 
R-squared 0.598 0.484 0.614 0.605 0.308 
N 17212 2962 5706 7891 653 
Marginal effects of schooling (OLS) 
   Percentile 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
  Experience 3.41 11.57 21.39 31.83 47.98 
Employee  
sample 
Marginal effects 0.058*** 0.052*** 0.046*** 0.038*** 0.028*** 
standard error 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Born  
before 1950 
Marginal effects 0.085*** 0.071*** 0.053*** 0.035*** 0.006 
standard error 0.018 0.014 0.009 0.004 0.007 
Born 
1950-1961 
Marginal effects 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
standard error 0.012 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.012 
Born  
1962-1980 
Marginal effects 0.043*** 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.061*** 0.071*** 
standard error 0.006 0.004 0.005 0.008 0.015 
Born  
in 1981 or after 
Marginal effects 0.084*** 0.062*** 0.036   
standard error 0.015 0.028 0.067   
Note: The standard errors are in italics and adjusted by clusters. *** Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, 
*significant at 10%.  Constants and controlled variables are not reported. 
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Table 5: Heckman Selection Model 
  Full  
sample 
Born  
before 1950 
Born 
1950-1961 
Born 
1962-1980 
Born  
in 1981 or after 
Ln (real hourly wage rate) 
Years of schooling 0.052*** 0.074*** 0.049*** 0.118*** 0.221*** 
 
0.005 0.019 0.013 0.01 0.037 
School*experience/100 -0.059*** -0.135*** -0.028 -0.105** -1.009**  
 
0.015 0.052 0.046 0.052 0.499 
Experience 0.027*** 0.117*** 0.062*** 0.116*** 0.369*** 
 
0.003 0.023 0.014 0.01 0.103 
Experience square -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.014*** 
 
0 0 0 0 0.004 
Select model 
Married 0.080** 0.248* 0.234** -0.054 -0.220*** 
 
0.034 0.145 0.113 0.033 0.064 
Years of schooling 0.210*** 0.246*** 0.282*** 0.182*** 0.217*** 
 
0.008 0.038 0.028 0.012 0.029 
School*experience/100 -0.470*** -0.651*** -0.574*** -0.355*** -1.040*** 
 
0.022 0.09 0.083 0.06 0.398 
Experience 0.172*** 0.062 0.193*** 0.213*** 0.535*** 
 
0.005 0.041 0.025 0.011 0.075 
Experience square -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.022*** 
 
0 0 0 0 0.003 
 Mills (lambda) -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.04*** 0.67*** 0.80*** 
standard error 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.09 
t value -5.04 -3.81 -3.27 20.68 8.87 
Wald test of indep. 
Eqns. (rho=0) 
25.62*** 13.51*** 10.79*** 342.22*** 70.59*** 
0 0.0002 0.001 0 0 
N 40,933 9,494 11,668 17,218 2,553 
Marginal effects of schooling (Heckman selection model) 
   Percentile 5% 25% 50% 75% 95% 
  Experience 3.41 11.57 21.39 31.83 47.98 
Full  
sample 
Marginal effects 0.050*** 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.033*** 0.024*** 
standard error 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Born  
before 1950 
Marginal effects 0.069*** 0.058*** 0.045*** 0.031*** 0.009 
standard error 0.017 0.013 0.008 0.004 0.007 
Born 
1950-1961 
Marginal effects 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 
standard error 0.012 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.011 
Born 
1962-1980 
Marginal effects 0.114*** 0.106*** 0.096*** 0.085*** 0.068*** 
standard error 0.009 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.017 
Born 
in 1981 or after 
Marginal effects 0.187*** 0.104*** 0.005   
standard error 0.023 0.030 0.075   
Note: The standard errors are in italics and adjusted by clusters. *** Significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, 
*significant at 10%.  Year dummies and province dummies are included for all regressions. Constants and 
controlled variables are not reported. 
 
